Realistische Phänomenologie:
Philosophische Studien der Internationalen Akademie für Philosophie im Fürstentum Liechtenstein und an der Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile en Santiago/

Realist Phenomenology:
Philosophical Studies of the International Academy for Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein and at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile en Santiago

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In Memoriam Dr. Don Ferrari

It is our sad duty to inform the English readers of Alexander Pfänder’s Logic that — much too young — the translator of this work, Dr. Donald Ferrari, born on March 8, 1950, just passed away on May 23, 2008. He is survived by his wife, Dr. Melanie Ferrari, and by his parents.

After having completed his translation of Alexander Pfänder’s Logik as well as the proof-reading and first typesetting of this work, Dr. Ferrari, to whom the International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein and at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile owes other translations, has left this world before he could see his translation in print.

Donald Ferrari was, until his untimely death, President of the Ferrari Research Institute (http://ferrariresearch.com/). He received his B.A., with a philosophy major and literature minor, from Fordham University, New York; his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in philosophy, with a literature minor, from the University of Dallas, Irving, Texas.

His most significant published work is Consciousness in Time. Dr. Ferrari was in my opinion one of the most talented younger phenomenological philosophers of the last decades of the 20th century, even a real philosophical genius, especially in phenomenological analysis, although his published works have not been numerous. This was partly due to an impressive perfectionism of the author who did not wish to publish anything short of perfection. Already in 1974, when he entered the

1 Alexander Pfänder, Logik (Tübingen: Ambrosius Barth/M. Niemeyer, 31963); (Mariano Crespo, Hg.), Logik, 4. Auflage, Bd. 10, (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Carl Winter, 2000).


Graduate Department of Philosophy, of which I was at that time Director, he submitted, with his application, a masterful essay on forgiveness which he had written at Fordham University in New York. As a student, he showed an outstanding ability to grasp deep and complicated philosophical problems very well and quickly, and to explain such subjects clearly and originally to his fellow students, an ability that allowed him also to make an excellent German translation of Reinach at a time when he hardly had any general knowledge of this language. His Ph.D. thesis was hailed as a masterpiece even by some philosophy faculty members who had no personal sympathy for his philosophical background.

His death is a great loss for the International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein and at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, for the phenomenological world, and incomparably more for his friends and most of all for his dear wife, a gifted philosopher on her own right, Dr. Melanie Ferrari, and his parents to whom the editors express their heart-felt condolences. R.I.P.

Prof. Dr. Josef Seifert, Rector
The International Academy of Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein and at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

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4 On whose Santiago Campus he just had spent a semester of research and translation work in 2007.
Translator’s Introduction

Pfänder and Aristotle

To some, it will undoubtedly seem naïve to bring out a translation of this book at this time, in the first decade of the twenty-first century. While admittedly of historical interest as a classic example of the philosophical method of early Husserlian phenomenology, commissioned by Husserl himself from one of his original students in the years just prior to the writing of the first volume of his foundational work, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie,¹ the book may well seem — as it probably already did to Husserl when he first read it — totally outdated. The complaint then, as now, would essentially be the same. It is a phenomenological analysis of Aristotelian logic, and Aristotelian logic has long since been surpassed, outdone, rendered more or less obsolete. Most logic courses don’t even teach the corpus of Aristotelian logic anymore, preferring to concentrate on the quasi-mathematical precision of truth tables. Aristotle’s original insights into logic, while without question representing one of the greatest feats of rational analysis and philosophical price de conscience of all time, have long since gone by the board. Like the funny Latin names that were once coined to help the struggling student remember the valid modes of the syllogism, they are hopelessly medieval. What is the point of bringing them up now?

¹ See the letter dated September 29, 1909 from Pfänder to Husserl, quoted by Herbert Spiegelberg in the forward to Logik, by Alexander Pfänder, 3rd ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer: 1963), p. viii:

But to think in this way would be to make a horrendous mistake and misunderstand completely the nature of Aristotle’s contribution. Modern logic, in spite of its admitted usefulness in dealing with complicated relations of sets and classes, is essentially a logic of symbols, a semantic calculus that allows us to clarify the meaning and truth-value of complicated strings of terms and quantifiers. It is ultimately a kind of (albeit very practical and sophisticated) word game. Aristotle’s logic, on the other hand, is not a word game. Rather, it is an attempt to throw light on the scientific discourse of his day, to elucidate and refine the ancient method of logical inquiry that was in use before the availability of empirical observation and controlled experimentation. In other words, it is nothing less than an attempt to map the character of rational thought. This is why it is of much greater and more profound interest to philosophy than modern symbolic logic, at least as a topic for philosophical investigation (especially the kind of classic, phenomenological investigation carried out here by Pfänder).

Aristotelian logic is not a logic of sets or classes, but of genuine types. It is absolutely essential that this distinction be recognized and appreciated if the true value of Aristotle’s work is to be understood. Aristotle saw reality as divided into natural genera and species, already present in the world and waiting to be discovered. He rightly grasped the tremendous significance of this fact. He saw that the task of science is to record and codify these natural types and investigate the relationships between them. And he himself was one of the first to do so. Thus, his logic is inexorably tied to these natural categories and cannot exist without them. Much of the novelty of modern logic, on the other hand, consists in the application of logical principles to categories that are not natural, but arbitrarily made up. In some cases, these are classes of objects that could never be found in the real world. To the modern logician, this makes no difference. Purely imaginary categories are as suitable a subject for logical investigation as any other. But to Aristotle, the application of his principles to categories or types conceived without regard to the natural world would have seemed totally pointless, or even insane. This is the main way in which his logic has been surpassed or superseded.

One example will have to suffice. Much has been made of the question of existential import and the application of the laws of immediate inference
to null or empty sets, classes of objects that do not, and perhaps cannot, have any members. When such an application is carried out, the traditional laws of inference, it is said, are no longer valid. According to the British logician and mathematician George Boole, all i and o judgments have existential import (i.e., imply the existence of some member of that class), while a and e judgments do not. This means that, in the Boolean interpretation, i and o judgments with the same subject and predicate can, in a given case, both be false (viz., if no members of that class actually exist), while the a and e judgments in opposition to them would both be true. In other words, when dealing with classes that have no members, contrary judgments can both be true, subcontrary judgments both false, and the truth of the universal no longer guarantees the truth of the particular.

This interpretation makes the most sense when applied to classes of objects that are arbitrarily designed to illustrate it. When confronted with a category like “flying dogs,” it seems reasonable to assert that the subcontrary judgments, “Some flying dogs have tails” and “Some flying dogs do not have tails,” are both false. The truth of either seems to imply the existence of members of the class, and — since we do not believe that there are members of this class — both assertions seem untrue. On the other hand, it seems equally reasonable to assert that, if “Some flying dogs have tails” is false, then “No flying dogs have tails” must be true. And this again seems to follow from the fact that no such animals exist (since if no such animals exist, no such animals can have tails). This interpretation is accepted by most modern logicians.

But the situation changes completely as soon as we consider not arbitrary classes, but genuine types. The problem of existential import never arises as long as we are dealing with essential judgments about genuine types, even if it is clear that those types have no existing members. In the proposition: “All perfectly just governments respect human rights,” the truth of the judgment is completely independent of the real existence of a perfectly just government. Even if we assume that there never has been, and never will be, a perfectly just government, the judgment remains true. The question of real existence has no bearing at all on its truth-value. Likewise, the proposition, “No plain Euclidean triangle contains more than 180 interior degrees,” is true, regardless of the fact that no really existing triangles can ever be plain Euclidean triangles. “Some virtues are easy to
acquire” and “Some virtues are not easy to acquire” are undoubtedly both true statements, completely apart from the question of whether any real virtues or virtuous people can actually be found. Another example which is especially clear would be the universal propositions, “All nonexistent things are possible” and “No nonexistent things are possible.” In this case, by definition no member of the subject-category can exist. Yet there is no doubt that both judgments are false, while the corresponding particular judgments, “Some nonexistent things are possible” and “Some nonexistent things are not possible” are just as certainly true.

In all these cases, the truth or falsity of the judgment is completely independent of whether or not the class or category in question has existing members. The reason for this is very simple. These judgments all assert essential facts about genuine natural types, categories that in some sense actually occur in reality. Even if these classes are devoid of existing members, the a, e, i, and o judgments that refer to them are still related in the traditional manner. Only when we introduce nonessential or fanciful types that do not naturally occur does existential import become a problem. To use Copi’s example, if there are no apples in the barrel, then both statements, “Some apples in the barrel are ripe” and “Some apples in the barrel are not ripe,” are equally false. On the other hand, the statement, “No apples in the barrel are ripe,” is true. But this is solely because the class of objects, “apples in the barrel,” is a totally accidental grouping of objects.

What this precisely shows is that what Aristotle had in mind by categorical judgments was not accidental facts about arbitrary or imaginary groups, but essential statements about naturally occurring types — those naturally occurring types that science actually studies. Even when these have no existing members, the traditional relationship between opposed propositions remains fully intact. There are no existing ichthyosaurs, yet the opposition, “All ichthyosaurs are aquatic reptiles” and “No ichthyosaurs are aquatic reptiles,” maintains the traditional relationship of contrary opposites: one statement is true and the other is false. In such cases, and only in such cases, does the traditional Aristotelian square of opposition actually apply.

The point is not to dismiss Boole’s insights as worthless. Modern logic is neither pointless nor unnecessary. But compared to the logic introduced
by Aristotle, it is *trivial*. It is more semantic than scientific, in the sense in which Aristotle would have conceived of science. Pfänder’s investigation of Aristotelian logic is, therefore, fully justified. This is not to say, however, that Aristotelian logic as it has come down to us is totally clear and without flaws. On the contrary, it involves many serious ambiguities and misunderstandings which Pfänder, in good phenomenological fashion, has addressed. This is the “traditional logic” he tries to clarify, and, in case after case, his clarifications are very much on target and make a serious contribution to our understanding of the subject matter. This is true, for example, in regard to his discussion of the limitations of traditional quantification, of the nature and function of the concept, of the formulation and interpretation of first principles, and of the meaning and validity of the various forms of the syllogism. In all these areas, his analysis is of immense importance to a correct understanding of logic and an honest, unambiguous interpretation of the Aristotelian tradition.

At the same time, his ideas concerning the purpose and object of logic as discussed in his prolegomena are ground breaking and open up an entirely new realm of phenomenological research. In particular, his distinction between the act of thinking (which is peculiar to each individual mind) and the thought (which can be shared) — a distinction we have tried to emphasize in this translation — is key to the entire realm of ideas and logical objects; while his manner of differentiating between psychology and logic as two distinct sciences is of lasting phenomenological value and application. All this makes his work, hitherto neglected by modern philosophy, well worth translating.

*The General Category of the Irreal and the Existential Gradation within the Realm of Irreal Objects*

In his introduction to the fourth German edition, Mariano Crespo has rightly pointed out what could be characterized as a confusion or oversimplification on the part of Pfänder in regard to the distinction between real and ideal being.² Crespo observes that Pfänder’s distinction

between thoughts and the act of thinking, and his characterization of thoughts as ideal, atemporal entities, represents a basic misunderstanding of the ideal sphere that unnecessarily excludes from it entities that are irreal, but nevertheless temporal. What is more, it can be argued that such a sweeping generalization as Pfänder carries out makes it difficult, if not impossible, to see how the real and ideal spheres could ever be brought together to form one reality. Such criticism has often been leveled against Husserlian phenomenology, especially the realistic brand of phenomenology to which Husserl early on subscribed. It might, therefore, be useful to take a closer look at the sphere of irreal objects in general in order perhaps to clarify this issue, which is of immense importance for logic and plays a major role in Pfänder’s analysis.

Any discussion of irreal objects today is made especially difficult by the fact that, since the time of Locke and the British empiricists, there has been an unfortunate tendency in philosophy to consider all irreal entities to be in every case merely mental “impressions” of objects inhabiting the real world of space and time. In this way, the term object has come to be limited to real, individual things, and the intuition of objects restricted to physical acts of sense perception. This situation has been further complicated by the failure to distinguish within the realm of the irreal between ideal objects in the strict sense and other logical entities, such as those that form the “ideal” components of human language, or those purely intentional entities (the so-called entia rationis) that are produced or projected by real acts of individual, conscious minds.

What is missing in the modern approach to irreal entities is the recognition of the true source of their objectivity, as well as an appreciation of the subtle existential gradation that exists within the realm of the irreal between the merely logical, the intersubjectively valid, and the genuinely ideal. Not every irreal entity can legitimately be called ideal. First, there are those logical unities of meaning that are produced or formulated by real, individual mental acts — entities like the logical content of an individual act of judging or concept-formation, or the purely intentional object of any intentional, conscious experience. While these may represent...
the logical or “ideal” side of the acts in which they are contained or expressed, they do not possess the kind of independent subsistence outside those acts to justify considering them a separate and fully distinct realm of objects in themselves. They are not sufficiently autonomous as entities to be called ideal in a genuine sense, requiring the continuous ontological support of the real mental acts that project them. When used in connection with entities of this type, the term irreal is purely negative and merely intended to describe their existential status as “beings-of-meaning” — something that is evident primarily in their capacity to be repeated indefinitely while remaining logically self-identical.3

States of Affairs

The next, more objective, category of the irreal are those entities Pfänder considers to be the correlate of the judgment. Adolf Reinach has called these Sachverhalten or states of affairs.4 States of affairs are irreal entities that come into existence as a consequence of the fact that something is the case within a given realm of being. They represent, therefore, a kind of “reflection” of the ontological order in the logical

3 This is the feature of ideality that Jacques Derrida emphasizes in his discussion of Husserl’s concept of the ideal. According to Derrida, “ideality . . . is but another name for the permanence of the same,” while the being of the ideal object “is proportionate to the power of repetition” (Speech and Phenomena: Introduction to the Problem of Signs in Husserl’s Phenomenology, in Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison [Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973], p. 52 [chap. 4]). Also see p. 6 (intro.). What Derrida does not grasp, however, is that this “power of repetition” itself presupposes the objective subsistence of ideal structures — ideal objects, as well as other irreal entities of a lower order of objectivity (viz., words and languages) — without which no logical significance or signification would be possible. Ideal being must, therefore, pre-exist every act of noetic constitution. Roman Ingarden makes a similar point in The Literary Work of Art, trans. Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973), p. lxxiv (preface to the first German ed.).

sphere. Every kind of existential situation involving every possible category of object, real and ideal, will be “reflected” in this way in the logical sphere by an appropriate state of affairs. For example, given that the river Ganges empties into the Bay of Bengal, this real, ontological situation will be “reflected” by the state of affairs: “The Ganges empties into the Bay of Bengal.” As long as this situation remains in existence, the above state of affairs will continue to “reflect” it and can be said to “obtain.” The same is true of an ideal situation like $2 < 3$. Such a situation will likewise be “reflected” in the logical sphere by the corresponding state of affairs: “Two is less than three.”

The “reflection” we speak of here is sui generis and difficult to make more precise. It is, of course, devoid of any personal, conscious or intentional element and follows necessarily from the existence of the situation that the state of affairs “reflects.” In knowing that a state of affairs does or does not obtain, I therefore know something about that ontological situation. The states of affairs themselves, however, are clearly distinct from the situations that generate them, since every unitary ontological situation generates an infinite or unlimited number of states of affairs. They also differ from the judgments or propositions that express them (even though we are forced to use the linguistic form of a judgment to represent the state of affairs). Purely as a judgment, “The Ganges empties into the Bay of Bengal” will have the same existential status whether or not the state of affairs corresponding to it obtains (i.e., whether or not the judgment is true). Thus, knowing the judgment does not yet represent an indirect knowledge of reality the way knowing the state of affairs does.

In the course of this logical “reflection,” the ontological situation that generates the state of affairs is broken down into its individual logical components. We mean that, given the geographical location of the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, this unitary ontological situation generates both of the following states of affairs (among others): “Minneapolis is west of St. Paul,” and “St. Paul is east of Minneapolis.” In other words, wherever an act of predication is possible, a distinct state of affairs will be generated. Although grounded in the same ontological situation, such states of affairs are nevertheless logically distinct, each representing one “unit” or “bit” of
indirect information about the ontological situation in question.  

Because states of affairs are “irreal,” they come in two varieties: positive and negative. A state of affairs may reflect either that something is the case or that it is not the case. Real being, along with its real properties and features, is always positive. Since the contradictory opposite of being is nothing, there can be no negative things or properties on the ontological level. Of course, there are privations on all levels of reality, phenomena like blindness or ignorance that are experientially positive but grounded in some absence of being. Privations are negative in a formal sense, when considered relative to the positive ontological context in which they occur. But they are not, for that reason, negative phenomena. On the contrary, when considered from a purely experiential point of view, a privation like blindness, ignorance, or famine is as positive as any other real determination of being.

When we move from the ontological to the logical sphere, however, it is always possible to grasp both what something is and what it is not, to list those features that a thing possesses as well as those it does not possess, to take account of situations that obtain as well as those that do not obtain. This kind of negative acquaintance with reality is never directly intuitive, although it may ultimately be based on an intuition of some kind. Rather, its very possibility depends upon the existence of negative states of affairs that reflect all that can be negatively asserted about reality, all that reality is not. Although this negative side of reality has no ontological status at all (except perhaps as pure possibilities), the logical or “ideal” status of the corresponding negative states of affairs is the same as that of every positive state of affairs. That is to say, as a “reflection” of reality, both positive and negative states of affairs subsist or obtain in essentially the same way, and it is only because all states of affairs have the same kind and degree of “ideal” subsistence that they can be linked together rationally to form syllogisms and chains of reasoning. In the syllogism:

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If the world exists, God must exist
The world exists
God exists

the real, ontological situations involved (the existence of the world and the existence of God) are on completely different levels of reality. Yet the states of affairs that reflect these situations can be brought together as equals within the same syllogistic format because they share the same status as irreal entities. A similar argument can be made regarding positive and negative states of affairs.

The cognition of states of affairs can take place in several ways. They may be apprehended directly on the basis of an intuition of being, they may be arrived at through a process of reasoning or inference from other known states of affairs, or they may be accepted on hearsay or the authority of another. But even when cognized directly on the basis of an intuition of being, states of affairs are never themselves perceived or intuited in the strict sense. Rather, they are apprehended through a special act of the mind distinct from all intuition and purely receptive acts of cognition. A certain specifically predicative apperception is required in order to draw out the states of affairs within a given ontological situation, and this apperception is “active” in a certain way. This is why, even where the apprehension of a state of affairs is based upon a genuine perception (e.g., the perception of a rose), the act in which we grasp that “The rose is red” is definitely something over and above the simple intuition of being. However, by calling this predicative apperception “active” we in no way mean to imply that it is expressive in the manner of a spontaneous response like an act of judging. Because of their close proximity in the intellectual life of man, the cognition of states of affairs has sometimes been confused with their expression in judgments. But nothing could be more misleading, since these two acts, cognizing and judging, have opposed spiritual directions.6

6 See my discussion of receptive and spontaneous subjectivity in Consciousness in Time (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 2001), pp. 7 ff. (chap. 1, §2). Meinong makes this mistake. He writes, for example, “I apprehend what existence and subsistence are . . . through the affirmative or negative judgments in question; moreover, I do so as directly as I apprehend a color by color-sensation” (On Assumptions, ed. and trans. James Heanue [Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1983].
The “activity” we speak of in connection with the apprehension of states of affairs is rather a kind of interpretive activity that consists in the need to focus the attention upon certain aspects of a situation in order to grasp the states of affairs implied in it.

While states of affairs enjoy an existence that is completely independent of any real, individual mental acts, they still do not possess the kind of timeless, immutable status required of an ideal object in the strict sense. The crucial factor here is the purely factual nature of their subsistence. Although the subsistence of a state of affairs (the fact that it obtains) follows with strict necessity from the existence of the existential situation it reflects, this nevertheless involves a certain factual contingency due to its dependence upon the actual character of reality at that moment. Even when a state of affairs has apriori necessity, its subsistence as a logical entity is “factual” in our sense. This is because, strictly speaking, it is the existential situation generating the state of affairs that has the necessity, and the state of affairs merely reflects this. Because of this factual contingency, we must place states of affairs, along with purely intentional objects, in the lowest categories of the irreal.

*Intersubjective Being*

We reach a new level of irreality, however, when we come to those entities that possess an intersubjective validity. By intersubjective validity, we mean an existence that is intentionally constituted, but which in its autonomy transcends the elemental relationship between intentional object and individual intentional act. This category is quite heterogeneous, since it includes not only linguistic unities such as words, word-meanings and languages, cultural and legal entities like laws, rules, constitutions and contracts, literary compositions and works of art like *A Tale of Two Cities*, mythological figures like the Centaur, and even legendary or fictional characters like King Arthur and Sherlock Holmes. Obviously there is considerable metaphysical differentiation here, since a word-meaning, a law, a mythological figure, and a novel are irreal in very different ways. In

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fact, the metaphysical difficulties that the analysis of this class of objects entails are well known and have received a great deal of philosophical attention in the past century. At the risk of oversimplifying, we can identify two general characteristics that distinguish these intersubjective entities from the merely logical or purely intentional object.

First, intersubjective being is much more a deliberate, conscious production of the mind than is the case with most purely intentional objects. The latter are really a kind of by-product of the acts that project them. They play no role at all, for example, in any deliberation that might precede the act itself. But an intersubjective entity like a name or a word-meaning requires some premeditation in order to be constituted. This is because the link between a word and its meaning (or a name and its object) is never intrinsic and so must be deliberately and arbitrarily assigned. The same is true of literary works and legendary or fictional characters — they require a special act of creation in order to become objective and are never mere by-products of the acts that produce them.

At the same time, this deliberate act of production can never simply be on the order of the individual act of a private subject. Rather, a specifically intersubjective component must enter into their constitution. The result is the creation of entities like words, names, languages, laws, and mythologies which are in some sense cultural or communal “possessions.” This applies mutatis mutandis to a personal creation like a novel which, in order to achieve full, intersubjective validity, must also enter the public sphere and be published. For this reason, it is never under our direct control as mere individuals to bring entities of this class into existence. Ultimately only a community (in the broad sense) can successfully constitute objects of this type, and it is precisely this intersubjective component (which is absent in the case of the purely intentional object) that accounts for the greater autonomy and objectivity of this third category. This becomes apparent in a striking way when we consider that, although these intersubjective entities must originally have been constituted through

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7 Ingarden’s *The Literary Work of Art* is devoted entirely to objects of this type, and has the distinction of having been completed before the author had any contact with Husserl’s writings on transcendental logic. Nevertheless, he reaches many of the same conclusions Husserl reached, in particular a rejection of the theory of language as originally advanced in the *Logical Investigations*. 
personal acts of some kind, in many cases they clearly outlive those originating acts and the subject or subjects who performed them.

This is why we have classified the concept, in the sense of the mental entity produced by an individual act of abstraction and concept-formation, as irreal in the lowest sense. Although, unlike the purely intentional object, the concept is a deliberate production or creation of a conscious mind (and in spite of the fact that its mental formulation is undoubtedly influenced in various ways by cultural and other external factors), concepts are nevertheless private creations and as such do not attain intersubjective status. Of course, when a concept is formulated in words, communicated and discussed critically by others, and especially when it becomes part of a shared, technical language, it must be considered to have passed from the private, logical sphere to the public and intersubjectively valid. This is the case, for example, with many standard scientific and philosophical terms.

However, when this happens a new, third factor comes into play that sets intersubjective beings apart from all other irreal entities, merely logical as well as ideal — viz., their openness to modification and change. An intersubjective entity may evolve or develop even after it has been constituted, as when a word gradually changes its meaning with use, and this can occur without the intervention of any new, deliberative acts. This clearly distinguishes intersubjective being from ideal being, with which it has often been confused, and shows that, although these linguistic entities do not possess the absolute, unconstituted objectivity of an ideal object, they nevertheless have a life of their own, one we as mere individuals are powerless to create or destroy.

A subcategory of intersubjective being, one that has attained some prominence due to another work by Adolf Reinach on legal rights, are those intersubjective entities like the promise that are constituted by what Reinach calls “social acts.” Social acts are acts that are addressed by one human being to another and include examples like the taking of an oath or the promulgating of a law. These acts bring into existence irreal, intersubjective entities of a special type that often have important moral

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and legal ramifications. Again, these are irreal objects that nevertheless are
temporal beings and can undergo change over the course of time. They
often entail special obligations, like those of the promise, that can bind a
person for the rest of his life and which, once constituted, cannot be
arbitrarily dissolved. Reinach points out that the social acts that create
these legal entities must be addressed to, and heard by, another person in
order to take affect. Only in this way do the legal entities they create rise
above a purely intentional existence and attain genuine, intersubjective
status.

*Ideal Objects*

When we come to the fourth category of the irreal, ideal being in the
true sense (including ideas and ideal entities like numbers), we reach a
completely new level of objectivity. This is due to the fact that ideal
objects are presupposed for the existence of everything repeatable,
including every repeatable intentional structure. They are, therefore,
presupposed for the existence of every constituting act. For this reason,
ideal being properly understood cannot itself be constituted, neither on a
private, individual basis nor intersubjectively, in the manner of a language.
Since all constitution requires stable, repeatable structures, some ideal
structure must preexist every act of constitution. But since logical and
linguistic entities require constituting acts, they cannot be the origin of this
structure.

Ideal being makes iteration possible because ideal being is nothing but
pure, abstract structure, a relationship taken in itself and apart from the
existence and much of the content of its terms. As a consequence, the
relationship itself becomes an object for the mind. Such a thing is possible
because every real relationship is in some sense distinguishable from the

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9 On the distinction within ideal being between ideas and object-like entities (such as
the Number 2), as well as between ideal rules and other ideal *entia*, see Josef
Seifert, *Sein und Wesen* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1996), Philosophie und realistische
Phänomenologie: Studien der internationalen Akademie für Philosophie im
Fürstentum Liechtenstein, vol. 3, pp. 199ff. (chap. 1, §5.4). Also see Jean Hering’s
seminal article, “Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee,” in
*Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, 4 (1921): 495–543;
individuals that make it up. We can, for example, consider the relationship of similarity between two real objects as a pure, abstract structure simply by prescinding from all those aspects of the similar objects that do not essentially contribute to their relationship as similar. In that case, we would prescind from every aspect of the objects (including their real existence) except the fact that they share some common feature, and so arrive at the abstract idea of similarity as “a relationship between two or more terms that share a common feature.” It can be seen from this example that the idea is a kind of blueprint or schema for reality, an abstract description of the objective phenomena that make up the content of our intuition. Ideas “describe” reality in the sense that they represent the iterative structures that form its framework and that we discover intuitively within the objects of our experience.10

It is this characteristic of ideas, that they describe reality in terms of its iterative structures, that provides the key to understanding the objectivity of ideal being. Ideas subsist ideally to the extent that they correspond to some authentic, repeatable structure. And this in turn must correspond to a genuine qualitative or quidditative attribute of an object. It is precisely this correspondence to a genuine (and, in some sense, irreducible) qualitative or quidditative attribute that raises the idea above the level of the merely irreal and secures for it an autonomous subsistence. A merely logical unity like a complex idea (“red and warm”), or like the “idea” of a particular individual, does not have the existential stature of a genuine ideal object largely because it corresponds to no single iterative structure representing a unitary datum of experience.

*Intuition of Ideal Being vs. Perception of Real Being*

Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the autonomy of ideal being is to consider the mode of its intuition, since a distinct species of autonomous object would be expected to correspond to a unique mode of intuition. Now when we compare the intuition of ideal being with the perception of real being, the first thing we notice is the difference in the intuitive content. The intuition of a real object is always presented in concretely sensuous terms, ultimately by means of its sensible qualities. This is true even in the

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10 This is what Seifert has in mind when he calls the idea a “necessary, essential plan.”
case of spiritual perception, i.e., the perception of another person’s spiritual qualities. Ultimately even purely spiritual attributes like pride and humility must, if they are to be perceived, be “clothed” or expressed in sensible qualities. The intuition of ideal being, on the other hand, is totally nonsensuous in nature. Although the ideal object does possess certain logical or ideal attributes (such as different degrees of depth, consistency, and meaningfulness), it is never apprehended through its qualities in the manner in which every real object is. In all genuine sense perception, the perceivable features of the object are given first and more primordially, and it is only on this basis that the object can be apprehended at all. But in ideal or eidetic intuition, the object is given first, and its logical properties are grasped only subsequent to its apprehension. As a consequence, the intuitive aspects of ideal intuition are not as obvious when compared with those of sense perception.

Contributing to the impression that ideal cognition is nonintuitive is another important characteristic of ideal being — its insubstantiality. As abstract structure, ideal beings are completely lacking in that concreteness which is found in every object in the real world, and this in turn can be traced to the lack of any unique or unrepeatable element in their existential makeup. Although an ideal object is always an individual entity, possessing its own distinctive qualities and features, it nevertheless cannot be considered a unique thing in the sense in which this term can be applied to every real being. This is because, as an abstract structure, its subsistence does not involve an individual esse or act of existence. This becomes apparent when we consider that, in its pure intelligibility, the ideal object does not stand on its own in such a way as would allow us to assign to each its own individual act of existence, but these entities interpenetrate and contain each other in a peculiar manner. Although each is a full-fledged individual (in the sense of being differentiated from all others, while incapable of similar differentiation within itself), these individuals nevertheless include each other in a literal way as parts or elements, the lower species always containing the higher. The ideal object “equilateral

Ingarden calls this side of the perceived object its “material endowment” and notes that “it is this, in the object, which first strikes the eye,” Time and Modes of Being, trans. Helen R. Michejda (American Lecture Series, no. 558, Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1964), pp. 23–24.
triangle,” for example, necessarily includes the ideal object “triangle,” and so must contain that ideal object as its component. Since there is only one ideal object “triangle,” it is this one self-identical entity which is both a distinct ideal object in itself and a component of another ideal object, an ideal individual and a part of every other ideal individual of a greater degree of specification. It can be seen that, because of the peculiarities of this arrangement, it is impossible to consider each ideal object as possessing its own individual esse or as existing simply in itself in the manner of a substance.

This difference in the apprehension of the ideal object leads to an important difference in the completeness or adequacy with which this type of intuition presents its object, as compared with that of sense perception. It is a well-known phenomenological observation that acts of sense perception never present their objects to consciousness fully or exhaustively in any individual perceptual act or finite series of such acts. Rather, each act of sense perception takes place through what Husserl called Abschattungen or “perspectives,” in which certain intuitive features of the object are given preference over others. Real being can never be apprehended in such a complete way that all of its perceivable features are intuitively present simultaneously, but certain features or “sides” will always be actually intuitive while others remain only potentially so. This is the case not only with the perception of material objects, but also with the spiritual perception of other persons and personal attributes. In fact, whenever we perceive real being — whether in the form of a material thing, an object of a higher order (like a work of art), a person, a personal attribute, or a real part of any of these — we perceive it as though its being surpasses or exceeds its givenness in this particular cognition; as though the thing in its transcendence includes features which cannot in principle become intuitive in this individual perceptual act — and, ultimately, even as possessing “a depth . . . that no progressive sensory deduction will ever exhaust.”12 It is an absolute prerequisite for the intuition of any real being that it be apprehended in this way, as having “sides” that supersede or conceal each other. Otherwise, the thing is not apprehended as real. This is

Pfänder’s Logic

an apriori law grounded not in the essence of real being per se, but in the essence of the human act of sense perception and human sensibility.

In the case of ideal or eidetic intuition, however, such a limitation is in principle excluded. This is first of all because an ideal object is not the kind of entity that can have hidden sides or intuitively inactual features. Representing pure abstract structure (and, therefore, pure intelligibility), it is in the nature of these ideal entities to be “transparent” to the mind that apprehends them, to be in principle totally disclosed to our mind at any given moment. The transparency we speak of here is connected with the fact that every determination of an ideal object is an essential determination, a determination that flows intelligibly from its nature as this particular idea. The absence of any accidental features makes these ideal entities thoroughly penetrable by the mind in a way that is unimaginable in the case of real beings. This is not to say, of course, that the full depth of an idea will always be immediately and intuitively apparent to the intellect upon first acquaintance, without any need to perform further acts of intuition. In many cases, the full depth of an idea may never be completely comprehended by the human mind. But even where it might be possible, through future insight, to bring out certain aspects or features of an ideal object more clearly or to analyze its makeup more profoundly, this never involves the uncovering of intuitively “hidden” parts or features, or the viewing of it from different “sides.” Therefore, even when additional intuitive acts are necessary in order to reach a deeper level of understanding, we still do not find the specific kind of incompleteness that characterizes every intuition of real being, nor the need in principle for future acts of intuition to complement or fill out what has already been given.

Thus, in regard to the acts in which they are apprehended, ideal objects differ from real objects in two important respects. First, they have no accidental determinations, no non-necessary attributes, no properties or features that do not flow intelligibly from their nature as an abstract structure. Secondly, they lack that real actuality or esse which constitutes the unrepeatable element in any being and which accounts for the concreteness of every real thing. For these reasons — their intellectual “transparency” as well as their ontological insubstantiality — ideal objects are given to the mind as thoroughly penetrable by our intuition and so as
intuitively complete in any given act. This is as opposed to sense perception, in which the object is always given as transcending in its perceivable features what is actually presented in any finite series of intuitive acts.

The Present Translation

It only remains to say a word about the text. My main concern throughout has been clarity, and I have not hesitated to sacrifice absolute literalness for lucidity. I must apologize for my extensive use of semicolons and dashes, but there is simply no other civilized way to translate German philosophy into English. The few notes Pfänder attached to the original German have been included parenthetically in the body of the text. The footnotes are all my own. I have rather slavishly followed Pfänder’s use of italic for emphasis, even though this may seem awkward or overdone to the modern reader. I have also made another concession to historical accuracy. Since I found it difficult in English to find circumlocutions for the terms intend and intentional (now sometimes spelled intensional), I have used them freely. But where this is not a translation of some form of the German intentional, I have added the actual German word in brackets.

Donald Ferrari
April 3, 2007
Santiago de Chile
1. Object and Purpose of Logic

According to an old and still widely held definition, logic is the study of thinking. Now this definition is not totally false, for the object of logic does lie in thinking. But it is imprecise and a bit off the mark, because the actual object of logic is not the act of thinking,¹ that psychic process or mental activity, but rather something that lies within it. The inappropriateness of this old definition became clear in the nineteenth century when it was interpreted literally and attempts were actually made to turn logic into a study of thinking. In the process, logic became embroiled in the domain of psychology, which, of course, also studies the act of thinking along with other psychic processes. Logic was thus in danger of being engulfed by psychology and reduced to one of its subdivisions. Nevertheless, it must have been sensed that logic is not, and never has been, simply a psychology of thinking, for frantic attempts were made to free it from this confusion with psychology — even by those who continued to hold to the old definition and regarded the act of thinking as its object. Two different paths were taken in the attempt to do justice to the distinctive character of logic.

The first began with the difference between theoretical and practical sciences and claimed to be able to distinguish logic as the practical science of the act of thinking, from psychology as the theoretical science. It soon became apparent, however, that while this remedied one problem — that of definition — and secured the science thus defined from being reduced to psychology, it brought about a new problem. For logic had truly never been a practical science. Consequently, as soon as this new claim was made, logic opened itself up to the charge of being totally useless.

¹ We shall translate the word Denken as “act of thinking” to distinguish it clearly from Gedanke, or “thought.” The first is a psychological occurrence that takes place within a real, individual conscious mind; the second is the irreal, communicable content of that psychological occurrence. This terminology, along with a number of other terms, was first suggested by Dr. John Crosby and will be used freely throughout this translation. Trans.
The second path also held that the object of logic is the act of thinking; but it sought to differentiate logic from psychology by assigning it the task of a normative science of thinking, while psychology was given the job of a factual science. Psychology was supposed to study how human beings actually think, while logic studies how they ought to think. But this again contradicts the nature of logic as it is actually practiced and, what is more, does not even isolate logic thoroughly from psychology.

Both attempts suffered from the basic mistake, traceable to the old definition, of continuing to identify the object of logic as the act of thinking. In fact, except for their introductory remarks, logicians don’t speak about the act of thinking at all, neither as it is nor as it should be; so we are left, finally, with the feeling that logic has been unsuccessful in clearly and correctly identifying its own object and purpose by means of a definition.

In order, then, to make clear what the actual object of logic is we shall, on the one hand, follow the lead of that definition and turn to the act of thinking, breaking it down into its distinguishable components in order thereby to discover something that is the object of no other science. And, on the other hand, we shall observe what kind of objects logic, as it actually exists, ultimately deals with. It will turn out that both these indicators converge on a unique realm of objects to which logic as a theoretical science refers.

The act of thinking is a real psychic event that occurs in all awakened, adult human beings. In every case, a series of five factors can be distinguished. First, there belongs to every act of thinking a thinking subject, from which the act of thinking proceeds or by whom it is performed. Secondly, there is, of course, the act of thinking itself, a real psychic event that begins at a particular point in time, endures for a while, and then ceases. Thirdly, there is always in every act of thinking a particular thought generated which forms the thought-content of that act of thinking. Fourthly, this thought-content — at least in those cases where one has command of a language — is more or less fully and clearly expressed or clothed in certain linguistic forms. And fifthly, the thinking subject, the act of thinking, and the linguistically clothed thought-content always refer to some object in the most general sense of the term. These five factors come together in a series of unique interrelationships, the
outlines of which we would like now briefly to trace.

Let us consider first the relationship between the thinking subject and the act of thinking. The thinking subject can exist in itself, even when it is not thinking. It need not think to exist. Most of the time, of course, it does think, even while other psychic processes like loving or hating, desiring or willing, occupy it as well. It may be that a subject cannot exist without some psychic life, but this still need not always involve thinking; so the subject has, with respect to the act of thinking, a certain freedom.

The act of thinking, on the other hand, cannot exist at all except as the act of a certain psychic subject. It cannot be separated from the thinking subject, whose act of thinking it is, without thereby being itself extinguished. Nor can the act of thinking that belongs to one subject be detached from it and transferred to another. Each individual act of thinking, if it is to be real, must necessarily belong to one and only one subject. The subject is the unique source and the necessary starting point for the act of thinking.

At the same time, the act of thinking necessarily has a thought-content. An act of thinking that had no thought-content, an “empty” act of thinking in this sense, would be impossible. The act of thinking produces the thought-content; it spins it out, creating it or reproducing it. The thoughts formed in this way are “sustained” [aufgehoben] by the act of thinking; they have their existence [Dasein] only in and with the act of thinking itself. It is, however, possible to remove the thoughts from the act of thinking that has produced them and transmit them to a second act. The very same thought of one thinking subject can be passed on, by communication, to a second and a third thinking subject and become their thought as well. What is more, these thoughts can be put down in writing and so seemingly achieve an existence [Dasein] independent of every thinking subject. Nevertheless, thoughts so conveyed and set down in writing really only exist [vorhanden] when they are actually being thought by a thinking subject. So, in spite of the intimate union between thoughts and the act of thinking, thoughts are still distinct from the act of thinking. While the act of thinking is a real psychic event, thoughts are not real psychic occurrences, but ideal, timeless structures. They are products of
our mental life and belong to a purely ideal sphere.\(^2\)

The act of thinking can also produce thoughts that are not expressed, set down, spoken, or formulated in any linguistic form. Thoughts are not necessarily tied in their being to linguistic expression. In every human act of thinking there is, in fact, a mute or silent kind of thinking that finds expression neither in external nor internal speech. In many cases, the linguistic formulation of a thought first occurs when the thought to be formulated has already been conceived in a peculiarly unitary [totalen] way and has even largely coalesced, during which time the linguistic formulation is carried out in stages. Even in those cases where the act of thinking is guided from the start by an interior discourse, the conceived thoughts are rarely clothed fully and completely in language, but remain for the most part unexpressed. The train of thought that unfolds in a solitary act of thinking is not, therefore, completely filled with linguistic material, but only here and there and in a haphazard way. Finally, even when, in communicating the act of thinking, we do in fact form complete linguistic sentences, whether orally or in writing, the conceived thought-content is still not exhaustively expressed in these sentences; its unexpressed components must, therefore, be fortuitously divined by the listener or reader if the thought is to be fully assimilated by him. And as little as thoughts are necessarily tied to linguistic expression, so little is a particular thought necessarily bound up with a particular linguistic expression. Rather, one and the same thought can be expressed not only in different linguistic forms in the same language, but even, with more or less precision, in totally different languages. Thoughts, therefore, have with respect to their linguistic form a greater or lesser flexibility.

On the other hand, linguistic structures need not have any thought-content at all. Word sounds can be produced or received purely for themselves, without any thoughts being connected with them. By the same token, written characters can also be produced or read in a totally meaningless way. Linguistic inscriptions may thus have a meaning in themselves or be absolutely and completely without sense.

From these circumstances it can clearly be seen that thoughts are different from linguistic expressions and must be distinguished from them,

\(^2\) On thoughts as ideal structures, see translator’s introduction. Trans.
even when the thoughts occur in a linguistic form that fully coincides with them.

The expressive relationship that obtains between a thought and a particular linguistic formulation is not merely the simultaneous existence of the thought and the linguistic form in one and the same consciousness, but a correlation of a totally unique kind. In certain cases, particular word sounds can be consciously present simultaneous with the thinking of certain thoughts, without those word sounds being the expression of those thoughts. This is what occurs, for example, when we hear the word sounds of an unknown language and, on the basis of our own mother tongue, reflect on things that are in no way expressed by the foreign words that we are hearing. Here we have meaningful [gedankengefüllte] word sounds existing simultaneously with meaningless [gedankenleeren] ones, and the difference between the expressive relationship and that of mere simultaneity of existence is clearly evident. This relationship is not reversible, since while the thoughts are expressed in linguistic forms, the linguistic forms are not expressed in the thoughts. Thoughts are embedded interiorly in the linguistic forms as their meaning. Of course, they can only be comprehended in those linguistic forms by persons who have learned the language in question and approach those word sounds with an open mind [mit geöffneter Denkphäre], so that the appropriate thoughts can arise naturally from the sounds of the words.

Acts of thinking and thoughts always of necessity refer to some kind of objects. Thoughts that have no relationship to objects at all — objectless thoughts or acts of thinking — not only do not in fact exist but are quite impossible, since it lies in the innermost nature of thoughts and acts of thinking to have such relationships. Nor are acts of thinking and thoughts in any way limited to certain objects. Rather, the domain of their possible objects is in itself completely unrestricted. First of all, they can refer to any category of entities. Not only things, but states, attributes of things, processes, actions, effects, relationships, and situations can all become objects of acts of thinking and thoughts.

Furthermore, their objects can belong to any realm [of being]. All domains of reality are in principle open to the act of thinking. The material world of inanimate things, the world of bodily creatures, the psychological world, the social world, the cultural world, the world of religious
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entities — all are available to the act of thinking as possible object-realms. In addition, all irreal objects, the ideal as well as the fictitious, are accessible to the rational execution of thoughts. There is, therefore, nothing in principle that could not become the object of an act of thinking or a thought.

While acts of thinking and thoughts can never be without an object to which they refer, objects in themselves are in no way necessarily ordered to them. Objects are not at all affected or influenced in their existence by the acts of thinking that refer to them. Every object admits not only a particular thought to refer to it, but an unrestricted number of such thoughts. A human being, for example, can be the subject of every possible opinion, assertion, reflection, inference, and conclusion; all kinds of valuations, commendations, criticisms, tributes, rebukes, reproaches, and accusations can be aimed at him. He can be the object of particular wishes, hopes, or fears. One can convey requests, suggestions, admonitions, and warnings to him; harbor certain designs and purposes relating to him; make resolutions and decisions concerning him. Finally, one can address specific challenges, commandments or prohibitions, and orders to him. Thus, a countless number of thoughts can settle on any object like a swarm of flies without that object being affected by it in the least.

The distinctness and relative independence of objects from thoughts can also be seen in the fact that the thoughts that refer to an object can change without the object having to undergo a change as well. Thus, one can form a new opinion about a person without that person changing in any way, either actually or apparently. On the other hand, the objects referred to by thoughts can change, actually as well as apparently, without those particular thoughts needing to change at the same time. The relationship of thoughts to their objects is precisely an intentional one, a mere reference that involves no real “contact.”

Furthermore, the objects to which the thoughts refer always lie beyond the thoughts and are transcendent to them. Even when the objects are something immanent to consciousness — for example, when a particular act of thinking and particular thoughts themselves become the objects of new and distinct thoughts — these objects still do not form components of the thoughts directed at them, but always lie outside them. One can say, therefore, that it lies in the nature of thoughts to have objects that are
exterior to them and, in this sense, transcendent. On the other hand, to be directed at objects is essentially immanent to thoughts.

Thus, if one singles out an individual act of thinking from the psychic life of man, it turns out, on the one side, to be linked necessarily to the thinking subject and, on the other side and with equal necessity, to involve a particular thought-content through which it aims at an object. The object at which the act of thinking and its thought-content aim depends, in each individual case, wholly and completely on the thought-content. It is possible, of course, on the basis of other acts (for example, perceptions, recollections, representations) for several objects to stand before the mind of the thinking subject simultaneously; but from these, by means of its thought-content, the act of thinking will mentally select those which, while remaining outside it, become its intentional objects.

The act of thinking, however, does not usually take place in the psychic life of man in isolation; rather, it is generally accompanied by and bound up with other types of object-consciousness and other specific kinds of activities that are also directed at objects. So one may, while one is thinking, simultaneously perceive a number of objects. As long as we understand by perception the having-before-oneself of originally and immediately given objects, this perceiving is no genuine act of thinking — it is not even necessarily permeated by an act of thinking, since perception can occur as a totally thoughtless kind of “staring.” Even in those cases where a perceived object does become the object of an act of thinking, the act of thinking that refers to the object is distinct from the perception of it — although it is then linked to that perception in a special way. In such cases, the perception forms the basis for the act of thinking about the perceived object. If this perception widens and deepens to become the perception of the state of affairs [that the object exists], it can simultaneously furnish the fulfillment and confirmation of the act of thinking. But it is in no way the necessary prerequisite for the act of thinking, not even for thinking the very same thoughts that are conceived and fulfilled through it. On the contrary, the act of thinking can take place without any perception at all.

Although often described as a representation or combination of representations, a closer look reveals that the act of thinking is distinct enough from the act of representing to be able to occur without any
representing taking place — provided one understands by representing only the genuine act of representation, the intuitive having-before-oneself of an object that is no longer originally given. Of course, an intuitive representation of the object to which the act of thinking refers can be combined with the act of thinking and form the basis, even in certain cases a fully adequate basis, for the fulfillment of that act. But the act of thinking is itself no intuitive representation; it can be carried out with exactly the same thought-content when the object it refers to is neither intuitively represented nor even representable. On its part, mere intuitive representing is no act of thinking either, but is in itself a completely unthinking occurrence, an act devoid of thought.

Among the perceived or intuitively represented objects, one or another can now become the target of special attention by the subject. This attention flows continually to the perceived or represented object from the subject. It is embedded in a special way in the acts of perceiving and representing, and it aims at objects. Nevertheless, it is in itself no act of thinking. Often when you catch yourself staring at a perceived object, you can establish with certainty that, although you were indeed thinking about something, you were not thinking about the perceived object itself, but were in fact observing it quite thoughtlessly. On the basis of this and similar experiences, one can conceive of a possible psychological creature in which all sorts of observing and scrutinizing of the most diverse degrees occur in regard to any perceived or intuitively represented objects, but in which no trace of an act of thinking is to be found.

It is more difficult to distinguish the act of thinking from that of apperceiving, especially since one can understand very different things by “apperceiving.” If, however, we understand specifically by this term the mental contact with, apprehension, discrimination, or amalgamation (i.e., the interior manipulation) of the objects of the perceptive or representing consciousness — a mental operation that often enough occurs in man’s inner psychic life — we recognize that apperception in this sense can also take place without any act of thinking; it is, in itself, a way of dealing with the objects of consciousness that is completely devoid of thought. Only when it is infused by a genuine act of thinking does it become a thoughtful activity.

If we look now at all the components of the act of thinking — in regard
to which we have distinguished five, namely, the thinking subject, the act of thinking, the thoughts, the linguistic formations, and, finally, the objects to which the act of thinking refers — we can see that within this circle of five factors only thoughts represent a domain that is left unclaimed by the other sciences. The first two factors, the thinking subject and the act of thinking, have already been appropriated by, and belong to, the sphere psychology. Of course, psychology cannot apprehend the act of thinking with absolute clarity without at the same time considering the thoughts that are generated by it. For this reason, it is not the thoughts themselves, but rather the psychic processes connected with the act of thinking, that are its true object.

Again, the fourth factor, the linguistic formations, has long been the province of historical, systematic philology. Of course, this science, too, must direct its gaze beyond the linguistic structures themselves to the thoughts and elements of thought expressed in them, in order thereby to cognize its own object clearly and penetrate it fully. But it does this only secondarily, not so as to make thought the center of its primary study.

The fifth factor includes the unlimited fullness of all possible object-categories and object-realms in general, which all stand open in principle to the act of thinking and thoughts. But the whole of this realm, except for the thoughts themselves, has already been assigned to the other sciences. Thus, the systematic and historical body of natural sciences deals with the material world, the animate as well as the inanimate. Systematic, historical psychology directs its efforts toward the world of the psyche. The world of social structures and processes is fully and completely comprehended by the historical and systematic body of social sciences. Of course, the domain of cultural structures and processes also includes, among other things, systems of organized thoughts — as, for example, the sciences themselves and the legal system. Insofar as these are historical structures, they are investigated by certain historical sciences (namely, the history of science and jurisprudence). The remaining objects of the cultural world, however, are fully and completely attended to by the historical and systematic cultural sciences. Finally, the religious world is addressed by theology.

In the realm of irreal objects, to which indeed thoughts also belong, particular mathematical data — size, shape, location, as well as number,
quantity, multiplicity, and succession — are already appropriated by the sequence of mathematical sciences.

In fact, the only object-realm left for the establishment of a systematic science is the world of thoughts. The question immediately arises, however, whether a systematic science of thoughts is even possible. Are not thoughts completely a matter of free will, regarding which there are no limitations on the subjective discretion of the thinking person? Can one reach more than an empirical overview of the forms in which men in general compose their thoughts? Or does the world of thoughts, although generated by the free discretion of human beings, nevertheless constitute a world of forms with permanent properties and specific laws governing their construction and combinations? Let us consider briefly, as far as is possible without prior and more precise knowledge of this sphere, whether the conditions for the possibility of a systematic science are satisfied by the world of thoughts.

There is no question that the world of thoughts exhibits a great variety of very particular kinds of thought-structures. A quick enumeration of some of these will make this sufficiently clear. It is easy to establish that there are such things as questions, conjectures, assumptions, and hypotheses; that among particular thought-structures we find beliefs, opinions, judgments, assertions, and theses, as well as cognitions, insights, and truths; that thoughts appear in specific combinations in inferences, deductions, proofs, and demonstrations. In addition, we discover in narratives, reports, announcements, acknowledgements, declarations, and notifications, as well as in explanations, discussions, treatises, talks, and lectures, thought-structures and thought-associations of the greatest diversity.

Still another group of thoughts confronts us in assessments, valuations, estimations, commendations, reviews, critiques, and testimonials. And closely related to these are tributes, vindications, rebukes, reproaches, indictments, accusations, curses, and condemnations.

Joining them are hopes, wishes, fears, thanksgivings, compliments, and praises. Not to be passed over are the many kinds of prayers, suggestions, warnings, admonitions, dispensations, promises, and enticements.

In addition, in the area of willing we find thought-structures like aims, purposes, resolutions, avowals, suggestions, proposals, conclusions, projects, and plans. And finally, we note the large group of thought-
structures of an imperative nature, in which we can distinguish summon-

ses, challenges, prescriptions, instructions, decrees, commandments, prohibi-
tions, mandates, and laws.

If we place ourselves now at a sufficient inner distance from this world

of thoughts to take in the profusion of entities comprehended by it, we can
also easily see that there are longer or shorter thoughts, simpler and more complex ones. And among these we find clear and ordered thoughts as well

as those that are more or less unclear and confused. Even more important

for a science of thoughts, we can determine that some thoughts are full,
mature, complete, and sound, while others are partial, immature, incomplete, and flawed. All this points to the operation of particular laws

according to which certain thoughts, if they are to be whole thoughts, must
contain a certain number of elements in a certain order.

Add to this the recognition that there are also, besides meaningful thoughts, meaningless, senseless ones, and it again reveals the presence of
certain general laws according to which only particular thought-elements
in a particular order can produce meaningful thoughts. In addition, we see
that certain thoughts, precisely because of their particular interior composi-
tion, necessarily carry an inner contradiction, while others that have a
different kind of construction are free of inner contradiction. If we consider
further the relationships between thoughts, we discover the remarkable and
logically important fact that some thoughts, completely apart from the
relationship in which they may have been placed by some rational being,
are in themselves either logically related to each other or completely unrelated; and many stand in direct contradiction to one another. Especially worth noticing here are the relationships of validity and implication, which are likewise totally independent of whether any
thinking subject ever employed those thoughts in such a relationship. These relationships require that the validity of some thoughts be given
necessarily with the validity of others, and that particular thoughts can only
be logically established on the basis of certain other thoughts. This applies
to all types of thoughts. For we distinguish in daily life between logical and
illogical thoughts and connections of thoughts in regard to all thought-
types. One can not only judge and infer logically and illogically, but
question, entreat, counsel, wish, hope, fear, desire, and command logically
and illogically as well.
Thoughts and combinations of thoughts also show aesthetic differences. Some are finely and elegantly formed, others crudely and awkwardly. Thoughts can be more or less beautiful or more or less ugly. One only need consider some of the thoughts of Schopenhauer and Kant. Finally, many thoughts in their construction and interconnections exhibit a very particular thought-style, one that is relatively independent of the style of speech. There are Baroque-style thoughts, Rococo-style thoughts, Victorian-style thoughts, and Gothic-style thoughts.

Accordingly, it is likely that the world of thoughts meets the objective conditions necessary to make a systematic science possible. It should, likewise, be easy to see that the subjective conditions needed to achieve a systematic science of thoughts are also realizable. One can, in fact, isolate the thoughts one thinks in themselves and lay hold of them. They are accessible, as a special kind of object, to our comprehension and act of thinking. One can compare several thoughts with each other, distinguish them, and draw out their common element; one can dissect them, add to or subtract from them, as well as vary them in certain ways; finally, one can unite several thoughts and apprehend their relationships and interconnections — in short, one can carry out in regard to thoughts all those acts that are necessary to produce a systematic science. To that end, however, one must think one’s thoughts in a manner different from the way we usually think them.

There are, namely, three different ways in which thoughts, specifically judgments, can be generated. The first is the naïvely expressive way, the way in which we usually think. It is characterized by the fact that our thoughts are formed by paying exclusive attention to the objects of our act of thinking, while to the thoughts thus formed we devote no attention at all. Even if we formulate our thoughts in words, we dismiss them without ever noticing their linguistic attire, as it were. At best, our attention chases after them, unable to catch up with them, unable to retrieve them. Such rash and uncritical thinking and speaking — which is merely a naïve form of self-expression — is the most natural thing for man. The consequence is that, even immediately afterwards, one scarcely knows what one has thought or said. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to hold that in such cases the acts of thinking and speaking take place “unconsciously.” We are indeed conscious of our acts of thinking and speaking — and all the more of the
thoughts we think and the word sounds we utter. But, even as they vanish, we neither retain them as completed products nor fix them firmly before our inner eye.

This latter is precisely what first confronts us when we come to the second method of forming and articulating thoughts, the critically inquiring way of thinking. Here, too, our main attention is turned to the objects of our thoughts as those thoughts are being generated in linguistic form — but now an offshoot of our attention is directed back to the thoughts we have produced and linguistically clothed, and we take them back in through [the medium of] their linguistic structure, to examine them as to the appropriateness of their formulation and their objective truth. Ultimately, this critically inquiring look at thought structures occurs while the production and linguistic formulation of our thoughts is actually taking place — while they are, as it were, in status nascendi. With it, we reach the level of a careful and critical act of thinking. But even at this stage, neither the thoughts themselves nor their linguistic expression are the main object of consideration. Even here, it is the objects to which the act of thinking and the thoughts refer that still occupy center stage. Such a reflective awareness [zurückgewendete Blick] can be directed more to the linguistic formulation of the thought, if linguistic accuracy or beauty is the important thing, or more to the thoughts themselves, if it is a question of their sharpness and style.

Only when the main focus of our attention during the act of thinking is withdrawn from the objects of the act and transferred in this reflective way to the thoughts themselves — something that should never be carried to such an extreme that the objects are totally lost and the ideas vanish — do we reach the level of genuine logical reflection [Denkens]. This logical act of thinking usually relies not only on the required co-attention to the objects of the act, but also clings to their linguistic expressions — it should not be allowed to remain there, however, but must venture out into the rarified and, at first, darkened air of the thoughts themselves, in order to establish itself permanently in that sphere.

These [three] different ways of producing thoughts alter nothing in the content of the thoughts. Rather, one and the same thought can be generated in any of these ways. Only that, in the case of naïvely expressive thinking, the thought will often slip away, wholly or in part, from our inexperienced