Perspectives on Theory of Controversies and the Ethics of Communication

Explorations of Marcelo Dascal's Contributions to Philosophy
Perspectives on Theory of Controversies and the Ethics of Communication

Explorations of Marcelo Dascal's Contributions to Philosophy
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning

The Series is developed in partnership with the Maison Européenne des Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société (MESHS) at Nord - Pas de Calais and the UMR-STL: 8163 (CNRS). Aims & Scope: The scientific objectives of the series, where humanities and social sciences are conceived as building interdisciplinary interfaces, are:

This series publishes volumes that link practices in the Humanities and Social Sciences, with theories in Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning, such as: Decision theory and action theory, Argumentation Theories in: cognitive sciences, economy, sociology, law, logic, philosophy of sciences. The series is open towards research from the Analytic and the Continental traditions, and has four main focus areas: Pragmatic models and studies that develop a dynamic approach to reasoning in which argumentation is structured as an interaction or as a game, in which two or more participants play moves defined by the type of argumentation in question, communication, language and techniques of argumentation: studies between the practical and theoretical dimensions of argumentation, as well as the relationships between argumentation and other modes of communication, reception, persuasion and power: studies in which reasoning practice is considered from the point of view of its capacity to produce conviction of persuasion, and focusing on understanding what makes an argument performative, Diachronic transformations of reasoning practices studies that emphasize the invention and renewal of reasoning forms, with respect to its performance and its effectiveness.

General Editor
Shahid Rahman (Lille, UMR 8163)

Managing Editor
Laurent Keiff (Lille, UMR 8163)

Area Editors

**Argumentation and Pragmatics**
- Marcelo Dascal (Tel Aviv)
- Erik Krabbe (Groningen)
- Frans H. van Eemeren (Amsterdam)
- John Woods (British Columbia/King’s College)

**Argumentation and Rhetoric**
- Fabienne Blaise (Lille, MESHS-Nord Pas de Calais)
- Gabriel Galvez-Behar (Lille, MESHS-Nord Pas de Calais)
- André Laks (Sorbonne, Paris IV)
- Ruth Webb (Lille, UMR 8163)

**Decision Theory, Mathematics, Economy**
- Jacques Dubucs (IHPST-Paris 1)
- Fredéric Jouneau (Lille)
- Richard Sobel (Lille)

**Cognitives Sciences, Computer Sciences**
- Yann Coello (Lille)
- Eric Gregoire (CRIL-Lens)
- Henry Prakken (Utrecht)
- François Recanati (ENS, Paris)

**Epistemology and Philosophy of Science**
- André Fuhrmann (Frankfurt)
- Gerhard Heinzmann (Nancy)
- Göran Sundholm (Leyden)

**Logic**
- Michel Crubellier (Lille, UMR 8163)
- Dov Gabbay (King’s College)
- Sven Ove Hansson (Stockholm)
- Tero Tulenheimo (Lille, UMR 8163)

**Political Science and Sociology**
- Jean-Gabriel Contamin (Lille)
- Franck Fischer (Rutgers)
- Josh Ober (Stanford)
- Marc Pichard (Lille, MESHS-Nord Pas de Calais)
Perspectives on Theory of Controversies and the Ethics of Communication

Explorations of Marcelo Dascal’s Contributions to Philosophy

Springer
IN LOVING MEMORY OF SHLOMIT BOTTON-DASCAL (1968–2013) R.I.P.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introductory Essay: «Sob o mesmo céu». Listening and Dialogue as Ethics of Communication</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Scarafili</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Exclusion Argument</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaron Senderowicz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationality and Controversy: Reading Darwin Through Dascalian Eyes</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Carolina K.P. Regner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsical or Intrinsical Necessity? Hobbes and Bramhall on Free Will</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Mishori</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locke and Leibniz on the Balance of Reasons</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markku Roinila</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonizing the Poles: A Note on Leibniz’s Notion of Justice</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noa Naaman-Zauderer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the “Sum of All Differences” and the Origin of Mathematics</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>According to Leibniz: Mathematical and Philosophical Aspects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michel Serfati</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emoticons and Illocutionary Force</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eli Dresner and Susan C. Herring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandom and the Boy Who Cried Wolf</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dana Riesenfeld</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker’s Meaning: With Reference to Marcelo Dascal’s Book Mashav HaRuah</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodica Amel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Religion and Politics: The Controversy over the Political Mandate of the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD) Relating to the Eastern Policy 1950–1972 ................................. 113 Hartmut Rudolph

The Dynamic Role of Toleration in an Emerging Pluralism ............. 121 Herzl Baruch

Elements of Controversy: Responses to Anti-Semitism in Nascent German Social Science ............................................. 131 Amos Morris-Reich

The “Esprit Prophetique”: Brief Remarks on the Phenomenology of Genius in Diderot ................................. 141 Giovanni Scarafile

On What Is Harmful: The Negative Basis of Normative Agreements ….. 149 Carlos Thiebaut

Unity of Science and Encyclopaedia: From the Idea to the Configurations 157 Olga Pombo

Habit, Self-Organization, and Abduction ........................................... 173 Ramon S. Capelle de Andrade, Mariana Claudia Broens, Itala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano, and Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez

Dialogues and Monologues in Logic ................................. 185 Shahid Rahman

A Controversy that Never Happened: Ancient and Modern Concepts of Opinion, Knowledge, and Information-Seeking Behavior .... 199 Peter J. Schulz

Postface: Philosophical Dialogue .................................................. 209 Marcelo Dascal

Author Bios ................................................................. 215
Introductory Essay: «Sob o mesmo céu».
Listening and Dialogue as Ethics of Communication

Giovanni Scarafile

How is the vision of the face no longer vision, but hearing and speech?
—E. Lévinas, *Is Ontology Fundamental?*

Abstract In the introductory essay I study the conditions by which it is possible to carry on an effective philosophical dialogue, finding in listening the characteristics without which dialogue is likely to become a monologue of the deaf.

First of all, I consider the difference between listening and hearing. With this distinction one needs to consider the early aspects of the activity of consciousness where one can individuate the presence of a primordial immediacy that, although not yet clarified in its essential constitution, exerts pressure against the I.

The most recent studies in both cognitive sciences and phenomenology have confirmed the importance of such an enigmatic presence, above all when one considers the processes of attention. On the first side, the cognitive sciences, it’s important to consider notions such as vigilance, voluntary attention, and orientation; on the second side, Husserlian phenomenology, there is the crucial difference between primary noticing, secondary noticing, and thematic intending.

Keywords Models of attention • Primary and secondary noticing • Thematic intending • Fallacy of obliteration • Tutelage of the other • Fear and rhetoric of the other • The eventness of the encounter

G. Scarafile (✉)
Department of Humanities, University of Salento, Palazzo Parlangeli via V.M., Stampacchia 45, 73100 Lecce, Italy
e-mail: giovanni.scarafile@unisalento.it

Philosophical Dialogue is the title of the international workshop organized in November 2010 at Tel Aviv University to celebrate Marcelo Dascal’s 40th year of academic activities. On that occasion, in a calm and friendly style, scholars from all over the world were united by the desire to discuss together the many aspects of Marcelo Dascal’s philosophic-scientific thought.1

Actually this first fact represents, in its simplicity, an important factor in understanding the contribution of the Israeli-Brazilian philosopher to the advancement of science. In fact, in a day and age wherein professional academic life drives scholars to narrower areas of specialization, Marcelo Dascal manages to be a scholar in the classic sense: with vast knowledge, many areas of expertise and infinite curiosity; and all these aspects converge in highlighting the virtue of listening.

The reasons to be thankful to Marcelo Dascal are not only profoundly personal but also intertwined with the professional careers of each of us. Despite this multiplicity, we believe there is a unique matrix able to embrace in a single gaze such benevolence: Marcelo Dascal is the one who taught us to listen.

Listening is not a vague virtue amenable to a sort of philanthropy, nor is it the distinctive sign of a privileged club. It rather represents a multilayered notion. Its physiognomy reminds us of a rhizome, a metaphor that has already been used in philosophy by Deleuze and Guattari and before them by Jung, to allude to the connection between areas apparently far apart, yet related meaningfully.

In this introductory essay, I would like to clarify, at least partially, although in the awareness of the difficulty of the task, the meaning of the listening I’m referring to. In this way, I could make more explicit the substantial reasons to be grateful to our Master.

The clarification of the notion of listening, first of all, will include the exploitation of the differences between listening and hearing. This first necessary step requires investigating, above all by reference to attention, the first reports of the activity of consciousness. Afterward, it will be clear that listening is connected with a particular way of acceptance and protection of an alterity never obliteratorable, and also that listening is directly implied with the notion of event. All these aspects converge to highlight the need for a renewed idea of reason. A ressemanticized reason, therefore, perceives further – through listening – its representative horizon.

1 Hearing and Listening

There are different kinds of listening. A first level, indicated by the term hearing, indicates the perceptual threshold by which we perceive sounds. First of all, it is a characteristic attributable to the auditory system, via the pathways of sound perception.

The difference between hearing and listening has an equivalent in the difference between seeing and looking. However, as Gadamer reports, while we can look away

---

1I would like to thank the Head of the International Board of Consulting Editors, Dr. Noa Z. Naaman, for her important contribution to the publication of this volume.
from something, we cannot hear away. Hearing therefore is not subject to our will. On the other hand, the impossibility of escaping the flow of data sensations makes evident our implication with the world. As such, hearing can be an antidote vis-à-vis the theoretical approaches which privilege the formal and eidetic dimension, rescinding the bond with the facticity, the concreteness of lived experiences. For this reason too, hearing constitutes an indispensable level since its activation is necessary for the development of another faculty, listening, as confirmed by Gadamer himself (2004: 458): “Hearing is an avenue to the whole.”

Listening indicates a disposition to pay attention to something presented in the flow of hearing, although not yet clarified. Already in Aristotle’s Ethics, the term “disposition” refers to a consolidated capacity, a virtue obtained with efforts and sacrifices. In the case of listening, the requested training is aimed at not ignoring the particular element which is present in the consciousness. Listening therefore is a disposability toward a request of attention in the dark, independently from the occurred clarification of the identity of the claimant.2

We have to acknowledge the presence of an “other,” testified by the hearing, and asking for our not indifferent attention. We are in the same condition described by Lévinas (1985: 89): “And me, whoever I may be, but as a ‘first person,’ I am he who finds the resources to respond to the call.” Lipari specifies such an indication in the following way: “Listening . . . . is essential to the ethical encounter – it is an invocation that can give birth to speech.”

In fact, it is before identifying and bringing back to our measure such an enigmatic presence, understood as “primordial immediacy that is prior to consciousness” (Lewin 2005: 377), that this not yet identified enigma presents itself as relevant for the I. The relevance of the enigma is reducible to its specific collocation in the flow of consciousness. It is present to the consciousness, but not yet identified by it. It, as it were, lives in an intermediate zone and from this position exerts an influence on the subject. The influence I am referring to corresponds to an involvement of the I, not episodic but substantial.

2This indication seems to be confirmed by Lewin (2005: 375): “We first perceive intention, and only later discern whether the agent is human.”
3The prominence of the pathways of sound perception as a condition of the possibility of listening should not lead us to believe that the other is only perceptible as a sound. The enigmatic dimension I am referring to can recall the meaning of Lévinas’ words, “face of the Other.” In this regard, Lipari (2012: 230) observes, “The face is neither figurative nor literal but is the expression of the demand of the other. Thus the face, like the face-to-face, is always dual. It is a relational and not an absolute term.” Lipari again observes that “the revelation of the face is speech . . . . And yet quietly embedded in this assertion of responsibility – the ability to respond – lies the prior action of listening. It is hidden behind a face, despite the centrality of speech and speaking.” With reference to the different ways in which the French phenomenology has understood the otherness, Dastur (2011: 165) has written: “For Levinas . . . . this experience of the face of the other is the experience of a speaking and not in the first place corporeal presence. There are consequently three different ways of finding an access to the other: the look for Sartre, intercorporeality for Merleau-Ponty and the face for Levinas.” In conclusion, we can say that the enigmatic presence of the other is not reducible to any specific sensory dimension. This conclusion – I think – is magnificently summarized by Lipari’s words: “aural eye that listens.”
In this situation, two attitudes become impossible, although for opposite reasons: on the one hand, ignoring the enigma by the I – in fact, given the existing involvement, ignoring the enigma would amount to a repeal of the same I – and on the other hand, trying to clarify the enigma. The eventual clarification of the enigma corresponds to making it thematic and eliminating the intermediate position occupied by it. In this respect, the eventual success, that is, the fulfillment of the thematicization of the other, would be the greatest defeat. Exposed to the full light of consciousness, the enigma would dissolve like snow in the sun, so losing its non-soluble density by which it could influence the I.

For all these reasons, it is essential to examine the main approaches to the study of the attention.

In more explicit terms, is it possible that an identification of the enigma without such an identification becomes a homogenization?

An important reference in studies about attention is the famous quotation by William James:

> Every one knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. (James 1890: 403–404)

This quotation has represented a milestone, although nowadays most of the studies move away from it.

If one considers Watzl’s warning (2011: 848), according to which “cognitive science shows that there are various attentional processes that only share certain similarities, but lack any fundamental unity,” then it is easy to realize how and why most recent studies have made a distinction between different kinds of attention:

1. Focal vs. global attention, where the former is directed toward a particular object or event, while the latter is distributed over a broader framework (Treisman 2006)
2. On-off attention vs. degrees of attention, where the difference consists in the idea that attention may or may not be activated in accordance with a gradualness (Depraz 2004: 14)
3. Voluntary vs. involuntary attention, where the former is controlled by the subject’s intentions, while the latter is unintentional, activated by the relevance of some sensory stimulus
4. Exogenous vs. endogenous attention, where the former is controlled by the stimulus, while the latter is internally controlled (see Smallwood and Scholler 2009)
5. Perceptual vs. executive attention, where the former consists in giving priority to certain stimuli, while the latter is a central processing capacity (see Pashler 1998)
6. The process of attending to something vs. the event of shifting attention from one thing to another vs. the state the process results in (see Watzl 2010; Wu 2011)

All these approaches have updated the oldest theoretical positions. However, we cannot renounce looking at these positions, hoping to find already there a useful model for our needs. Broadbent (1958) has equated attention to a filter able to
act as a selective mechanism. The selection would be based not on the analysis of the meaning, but evaluating other information, including intensity. I think that this particular approach – although not updated – contains some interesting aspects because it individuates an area standing before the thematization as an integrant part of the attentional phenomenon.

Now, considering the main theoretical approaches to the topic of attention in the context of experimental psychology, Vermersch selects three main constituents of the attention:

(a) **Vigilance.** Vigilance, a state of awakening to the world, based on the activation of a diffuse nerve structure called “the reticule.”

(b) **Orientation.** Based on a structure and upon distinct nerve pathways whose times of response are in the range of 20–40 ms. It corresponds to a characteristic of identification and permits the organism to respond in the most rapid way.

(c) **Voluntary attention or consciousness.** This constituent has times of responses in the range of 400 ms, “which is the time corresponding to a semantic identification . . ., thus a range of extremely slow measure (globally, a factor of 10) in relation to orientation” (Vermersch 2004: 53).

The main meaning of the previous schema consists in identifying the level of orientation, activated “without semantic identification” (Vermersch 2004: 52) and therefore once again with reference to a pre-thematic level.

Now, it remains to investigate what was the contribution of phenomenology to research on attention. In this regard, I will recall the §92 of the First Book of Ideas and then consider the Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre Sommersemester 1908 (hereafter, Vorlesungen) (Husserl 1986) and finally Experience and Judgment (Husserl 1973).

Starting from Ideas basically means that attention is not separated by the topic of intentionality. The merit of §92 of Ideas I, entitled The Noetic and Noematic Aspects of Attentional Changes, in fact reiterates this relationship of dependency.

In Husserl’s words (1983: 224–225):

> Attention is usually compared to a spot light. The object of attention, in the specific sense, lies in the cone of more or less bright light; but it can also move into the penumbra and into the completely dark region. . . . The ray of attention presents itself as emanating from the pure Ego and terminating in that which is objective, as directed to it or being diverted from it.

Such indications, which already highlight that attention is dynamic, not static, phenomenon should be integrated by what Husserl writes in the Vorlesungen.

---

4Recalling Husserl’s ideas on attention is here made independently from the chronology of his philosophical production. I don’t consider the contribution of Philosophy of Arithmetic in which Husserl introduces the criterion for distinguishing between a plurality and a group and this criterion consists in a certain kind of regard. In this way, we find some anticipations of the acts of grasping which Husserl will develop in the more mature phases of his philosophy.